

BCPR/RBLAC INTEGRATED MISSION NOVEMBER 2007 REPORT

I. BACKGROUND TO THE BCPR/RBLAC MISSION

In consultation with the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (RBLAC), Colombia was identified as a priority country in the region requiring comprehensive and sustained support from BCPR. It was therefore decided that a strategic partnership framework should be developed between BCPR and the Colombia Country Office (CO) to ensure that such support is framed within the overall development context of the country. This required a series of missions from BCPR to identify key areas of support¹ and an integrated BCPR-RBLAC scoping mission to determine and agree on the key components of such a partnership.

There were three key factors that determined the timing and scope of the mission. Firstly, the CO has now created a new Peace and Development Cluster that brings together all relevant streams of work on conflict prevention and early recovery. This new cluster will be the motor behind the development of operational programmes in the provinces (territories). The CO was interested in obtaining BCPR support to develop a more coherent and comprehensive strategy towards UNDP's support to the conflict affected territories. Secondly, the CO has now launched its new CPD and CPAP for 2008-2011 based on the UNDAF, where Peace and Development is one of the three central pillars for the new program.

Finally, while the conflict dynamics and impacts in Colombia have not changed significantly over the last year (particularly at sub-national levels) there are some new windows of opportunity to expand conflict-related CPR programming at the sub-national level in such areas as support to IDPs, reintegration of combatants and IDPs, mine action, and transitional justice. The CO sees the development of these sectors as part of a broader integrated approach to poverty reduction and conflict prevention in the territories. Thus, the development of a conflict mainstreaming strategy (as a founding block of the new phase of programming in the territories) is seen as essential to ensure all UNDP supported interventions (either as UNDP or as UN) contribute in an integral manner to achieve the UNCP objectives.

The aim of the Mission was to strengthen ongoing efforts undertaken by UNDP Colombia to develop and mainstream conflict sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian action and peace-building, recovery and reintegration, and help identify strategic entry points and support from BCPR in the context of the design of a Partnership Framework.

The objectives of the BCPR-RBLAC mission were, therefore, were threefold (see Annex 1 for detailed Terms of Reference (TOR)):

- a) Develop, together with the RC/HC Office and UNDP, a strategy and a work plan to mainstream conflict prevention into UNDP programming and UN System initiatives.

¹ This is the first of three BCPR lead Missions to help define areas of support from BCPR to the Colombia CO.

- b) Recommend a strategy and actions to strengthen UNDP's programmes at the territorial (local) level including: a rapid review of existing projects and programmes, b) identification of early recovery priorities c) Identification of programmatic gaps and possible entry points and recommend strategies to address them.
- c) Develop guidelines and a plan for the implementation of conflict analysis exercise at the local level to be implemented at the territorial/local level.

RESULTS DELIVERED BY THE MISSION

The following outputs were delivered to the Country Office as part of the mission:

- a. A one day and a half-day workshop with all Bogota and some field-based programme staff to begin the process of raising awareness around "conflict-sensitivity" and "CPR mainstreaming", identify barriers and opportunities as well as possible joint entry points for several programme areas to initiate joint planning and programming including at the sub-national level;
- b. Identification of priorities and entry points for the Strategic Partnership Framework document to start soliciting information that needs to be incorporated by the Country Office;
- c. Support to the CO in streamlining operations and systems in the Peace and Development Cluster (through a follow up Mission);
- d. The present report containing recommendations, for integrated programme conflict-sensitive planning, local level programming (territories), early recovery (for UNDP and the UN Cluster) and the structure and functioning of the Peace and Development Cluster.

The Mission team consisted of Eugenia Piza Lopez (Team Leader) Senior Recovery Adviser Conflict and Governance BCPR, Celine Moyroud, Conflict Prevention Adviser, BCPR, Carmen Salguero, Programme Specialist Latin America and the Caribbean, BCPR and Marc-Andre Franche, Programme Adviser, RBLAC.

MISSION METHODOLOGY

The mission used a combination of interviews, field visits, and workshops to consult with internal and external actors, which included government counterparts, donors, UN agencies, NGOs, and CBOs. This helped to understand the context in which the CPR programmes are formulated and implemented in Colombia. As per the TOR, the mission spent substantial time focusing on the following:

- Reviewing the REDES programme and identifying strategies to mainstream the REDES approach into the development of territorial programmes;
- Priorities, programme of work, structure and delivery capacities of all programmes in the Peace and Development Cluster;
- The strategy and functioning of the UNDP-IOM led Early Recovery Cluster and UNDP's Early Recovery Programming;

In reviewing the REDES programme and the role of the Peace and Development Cluster, the mission met with relevant government agencies, UN partners, civil

society organizations. In addition, 3 sessions were held with the Peace and Development Cluster (Coordinator, Programme Officers of victims, early recovery, transitional justice, good practices and civil society, projects as well as coordinator and staff managing territorial programmes). The Mission also met with counterparts and the coordinator for REDES-ART. The Mission also included a 2 day field trip to Huila aimed, primarily at familiarizing Mission members with local conflict-affected contexts, interface with local communities and listen, first hand, how local actors define priorities, challenges and entry points. The field trip also served to test propositions of how best to mainstream the "REDES Approach" across all territorial initiatives. The field trip facilitated the development of recommendations that build upon existing initiatives but take into account new realities and new possibilities for UNDP's engagement.

Recommendations related to integrated and coherent responses at local level (territories) and, in particular those associated with a conflict mainstreaming strategy were tested and extensively discussed in a one-day and a half workshop with all the UNDP programme staff. The outcomes of the workshop set the stage for future joint territorial planning and are fully incorporated into the recommendations of this Mission.

The findings and recommendations of this report will be complemented with a follow up technical Mission looking at 2 thematic areas: Mine Action and and Reintegration (to take place in Feb-March 2008). While findings of these 3 Missions will form the basis for the Partnership Framework, recommendations from this report are broader and provide the building blocks for the overall partnership strategy.

II. THE CONTEXT IN COLOMBIA

After almost 50 years of internal armed conflict and several attempts at negotiating peace, Colombia remains immersed in violence, with the state pitted against two well-armed guerrilla organizations, known as the "*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*" (FARC) and the "*Ejercito de Liberación Nacional*" (ELN). The ELN holds around 4.500 combatants while the FARC boasts around 16.500 combatants covering most of the country's geography. A third armed group, the paramilitaries and/or self - defense groups (the largest being the "*Autodefensas Unidas*" de Colombia, AUC) have been demobilizing since the adoption of the Peace and Justice Law in 2005. Since then, 31.671 members of the AUC have collectively demobilized, 34 armed structures have been dismantled and more than 18,000 arms handed-in. This said the OAS, which is in charge of international verification of the process, has underlined the re-emergence of new "criminal" gangs in the areas previously controlled by the paramilitaries and carrying out similar activities. In particular, it has identified over 22 groups with more than 2000 members, some of them previously demobilized. In addition, some 6000 persons have demobilized individually, mostly from the FARC and the ELN since 2005.

The country's violence indicators have generally been improving as a result of the investments in security (34% increase in military and police force; 85% to 100% presence of police in municipalities) and new government's policies, which range from demobilization to a more aggressive strategy against the ELN and the FARC. Between 2002 and 2007, homicides have fallen from 28,780 to 17,198, kidnappings from 2,882 to 521 and massacres from 111 to none. Homicide of vulnerable groups, notably indigenous, union leaders and human rights advocates have also diminished in absolute

terms, although human rights groups have underscored that those homicides have now become far more selective.

Internal displacement due to the conflict has also fallen, although it remains one of the highest in the world, with over 2 million people displaced according to the government (other non-governmental sources, such as the NGO Codhes, argue there are now over 4 million displaced). Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela also register over 75,000 Colombian refugees. Colombia is also the country with most anti-personal mines accidents in the world, with 1,106 new events and 547 accidents of which 28% were civilians and 72% military. In the last 18 years, Colombia has suffered 8598 incidents and 3378 accidents.

Drug trafficking remains rampant, and has proved a critical factor on the dynamics of conflict, the ongoing displacement of population, and the wider social fabric and cohesion of the country. The Government has maintained its eradication strategy, mainly through aerial spraying. Despite those efforts, the total surface has generally grown, with a recent reduction of 9% in 2007, compared to 2005 according to UNODC. Colombia now counts with 78.000 acres of coca compared to 163.000 in 2000 with 83% of fields in 7 departments (Nariño, Putumayo, Meta, Guaviare, Antioquia, Vichada and Caquetá). According to expert analysis, in 2003 money derived from the drug trade represented 70% and 42% of the paramilitaries', and the guerrillas' income, respectively. The entire drug trade is estimated to be worth around 2.3% of GDP.

As outlined by Colombia's 2003 National Human Development Report and subsequent research, common explanations of Colombia's armed conflict often fall in either of two extremes: they tend to be very simplistic or far too vague. Moreover, people's attitude and Government's response to the conflict is either excessively optimistic or pessimistic. The NHDR suggested a multi-dimensional and human development approach to tackle it.

In particular, the NHDR stresses the basic fact that war has been a complete failure. After 50 years of combat, the insurgency has been unable to seize power and the State incapable of stopping the bloodshed. As a result, the conflict has evolved towards the regions, while cities have remained relatively safe and developed very quickly². The conflict's victims have therefore climbed and its human development indexes plunged. These effects created a profound crisis in Colombia's international relations, economic growth and political system, especially due to the conflict's connections with the drug trade. As underlined in the report, Colombia's armed conflict consists of a number of conflicts, which will require an ensemble of balanced policies. It is the varying combination of factors, which give the Colombian conflict a particularly high level of complexity, durability, diversity of scenarios and expressions. This single fact is the reason why, to the day, so many attempts in favor of peace have failed. This has created a dynamic where institutionally weak, traditional and violent territories cohabit with a modern, democratic and peaceful center. Colombia maintains one of the longest uninterrupted succession of democratically elected governments and can count on an impressive set of institutions and capacities. All in all, Colombia is not a failed state but includes areas which are far from the reach of the center where the state institutions and legitimacy is thin.

In this context, the international community has played a variety of support roles to the different Government policies. Small groups of countries, at times with the UN, have

² This is the main reason why, at the national level, Colombia will attain all MDGs by 2015 while vulnerable groups, notably indigenous, afro-descendant and IDPs, and some regions will lag behind.

provided good offices to support ongoing negotiations efforts. Additionally, bilateral cooperation, especially with the US, as well as with some European countries, has focused on military and anti-narcotics operations support. In the last 10 years or so, though, bilateral and multilateral cooperation has increasingly targeted support to humanitarian initiatives as well as to concrete conflict prevention initiatives, particularly at the territorial level. The international community has also invested considerably in strengthening human rights and peace civil society organizations. For instance, since 2003, through the London-Cartagena- Bogota process, the international community, with the support of the UN system, has facilitated a crucial platform for dialogue between the Government, the international community and civil society which has been important in determining joint priorities and agreeing on key responses to build peace.

The Uribe Government has been particularly keen in describing the armed conflict as a "situation of general violence against illegal armed gangs or terrorists", rather than as an "internal armed conflict" where the State engages with legitimate actors. It has also constantly avoided describing the situation as a "humanitarian crisis" but rather as a series of "humanitarian situations", not to be tagged or associated as a failed State. The presence of all groups on the US list of terrorist organizations has been important for the Government and is a factor in the current peace negotiations.

The Government's "democratic security" policy has been very successful on a number of fronts, including: seriously weakening the ELN, pushing back the FARC further towards Colombia's borders, demobilizing paramilitary groups, assuring military and/or police presence everywhere, and increasing state services following military operations. Aided with very favorable economic growth, Colombia is also doing very well in terms of poverty reduction and the extension of basic social services and is on track to attain all MDGs nationally by 2015. Thanks to a series of competent administrations, key cities, such as Bogota and Medellin, have significantly increased the well-being of their citizens.

With the Justice and Peace Law which governs the demobilization of paramilitaries, victims – either in groups or individually – have been given an important place in the national peace agenda. The creation of the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation, which now has a victims' data base of over 100,000 people, provides an official space to advance towards recognition and repairs for the victims of the armed conflict.

Efforts to reach a Humanitarian Accord to assure the liberation of kidnapped victims (many of them political leaders, especially with the FARC), have stumbled despite the involvement of the Catholic Church and other personalities and groups. While the recent involvement of President Chavez allowed the liberation of a few kidnapped victims, it also considerably strained relations between the two countries³. On the other hand, the prospect of an agreement with the ELN remains distant, principally in regards to the conditions for verification of a potential ceasefire. The recent crisis with Ecuador and Venezuela also demonstrated how the conflict is increasingly regional, at least in character and in its solutions.

Notwithstanding these efforts and the progress achieved, the conflict continues and violence, in the form of drug trafficking, displacement and the presence of armed and illegal groups which erode the legitimacy of the State, remain a daily reality for Colombians.

³ Insert explanation on recent crisis
BCPR/RBLAC Mission Report – Colombia

III. BCPR SUPPORT TO THE COLOMBIA CO TO-DATE

Since 2003, BCPR and RBLAC have been providing continued support to UNDP Colombia to strengthen its programmatic approach to crisis prevention and recovery. This include: technical assistance, financial support, management support, ongoing backstopping and political accompaniment. The bulk of BCPR's support to the Country Office has been focused on the REDES programme, which was developed as an initiative to address violent conflict, on the understanding that in the midst of conflict it is not only possible but imperative to undertake human development initiatives, parallel to humanitarian responses⁴.

BCPR Project Portfolio: Table of Projects

Project	Year	Category	Funds
Reconciliation and Development Programme (REDES)	2004	Prevention	800,000
Emergency Funds Floods in Santander	2005	Recovery	100,000
Reconciliation and Development Programme (REDES)	2005	Prevention	760,000
Institutional Strengthening in post-disaster planning in Bogota	2007	Recovery	270,000
Support to Post Disaster Recovery Process in La Mojana floods	2007	Recovery	100,000
TOTAL			2,130,000

IV. STRENGTHS, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND GAPS OF UNDP COLOMBIA VIS-A-VIS PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

- UNDP Colombia is uniquely positioned to play a key role on conflict prevention and early recovery in Colombia. Through its work on REDES and the 2003 National Human Development Report, UNDP has developed a comprehensive vision of the causes and dynamics of the conflict, key actors and possible entry points for peace-building. UNDP has developed sound and tested models of intervention for peace work in the midst of violent conflict.
- UNDP is perceived as a neutral agent by the government and has high levels of legitimacy amongst humanitarian and development actors at local (territorial level). In the Colombian context where there is limited space for peace related work, UNDP has good access and trust from national government and continuously provides a unique platform for dialogue between government and civil society. UNDP is acknowledged to have contributed, significantly, to create spaces for state-civil society engagement while protecting this space for civil society organizations to continue their work on peace and development.

⁴ According to the 2003 NHDR, such initiatives were aimed at:

- a) Working on conflict dynamics in a comprehensive way at national and sub-national/regional levels;
- b) Encouraging the development of policies that protect victims and affected communities and promote peace;
- c) Discouraging actors or interventions that, intentionally or not, fuel the armed conflict and violent practices.

- The changes in the role of UNDP from development support services to an agency that will substantively engage in national and local level development policy and programming, which is a regional trend supported by RBLAC, will position UNDP as a key development player (beyond issues of conflict and peace). This change, which is supported and endorsed by the GoC, will provide unique opportunities to strategically use development as an entry point for conflict prevention.
- The REDES programme is a trade-mark in Colombia and synonymous of good practice towards supporting peace actors, change agents and developing strategic partnerships. It has also acquired significant global importance for UNDP, in terms of lessons to be learnt in areas of peace work in conflict contexts, reconciliation and the promotion of local peace building processes.
- The Country Office, including through its REDES programme, has become a key player to carry forward the recommendations of the IASC, particularly in the Early Recovery Cluster, which is chaired in Colombia by UNDP and IOM. This represents an excellent window of opportunity to take forward the humanitarian reform agenda, through refocusing the partnership with OCHA and strengthening UNDP's own response at local level.
- At the time of the mission, UNDP Colombia was in the process of finalizing the new phase of the REDES programme (2007-2009), following a joint SIDA/UNDP evaluation of this initiative. Key recommendations from this process included:
 - ⇒ The overall need to strengthen the sustainability of REDES by refocusing towards a more integrated development strategy, to ensure local ownership of the local level peace initiatives and sustainability of networks being supported;
 - ⇒ A more mainstreamed focus on human rights at all levels of the programme;
 - ⇒ The inclusion of the most vulnerable groups in the design and implementation of the programme;
 - ⇒ A better articulation of the REDES strategy at the territorial level within the wider UNDP programme in Colombia;
 - ⇒ The need for strengthening relationships with key governmental institutions directly engaged in peace-related issues;
 - ⇒ The need for improved coordination among donors supporting REDES;
 - ⇒ Increased emphasis on measuring impact and documenting best practices.

In addition to the above recommendations, a high-level Mission from BCPR and RBLAC in February 2007, highlighted a number of key issues that would continue to frame BCPR's engagement with UNDP Colombia in the future. These include:

- ⇒ The need to articulate REDES as a strategic framework or approach within which all UNDP interventions in peace and development, especially in conflict affected regions ;
- ⇒ The strengthening and further development of initial attempts to link peace and reconciliation efforts across the Colombian-Ecuadorian border;
- ⇒ Further emphasis on analysis, impact assessment, monitoring and learning for both the purpose of the REDES programme as well as globally;

- ⇒ Deeper involvement of other UN agencies in the next phase of the REDES programme;
 - ⇒ The need to diversify the funding base of the REDES programme.
- Many of the above recommendations have been taken on board by the CO. The new leadership has worked over the last year to consolidate UNDP's portfolio, create greater levels of programmatic coherence and have a more strategic approach to programming (reflected in the new programme proposals Art REDES and REDES). This has required a major restructuring and decentralization of functions (including the agreement to develop territorial programs separately managed) and refocusing on the local level to outreach to the territories. With REDES, UNDP as a unique platform to deliver participatory, conflict sensitive and peace orientated development.
 - In line with changes explained above, the new structure (Peace and Development and other clusters) could facilitate coherence and alignment. There is today more of a "readiness" in the office to think holistically about the needs of a territory and design interventions that take conflict dynamics on board. It is expected that the new structure will eliminate a former piece-meal approach with a range of small initiatives and lead to integrated programming, as expected by key donors.
 - REDES has excellent staff, highly committed and who understands the history of the programme, as well as the Colombian context. They have knowledge of the actors, the networks and access.
 - While there are significant strengths' and comparative advantages for UNDP in Colombia, and a new impetus generated by new committed leadership, the successful shift towards the direction specified by the CO above, will require well managed and effectively supported, planning and programming processes and follow through to internal change processes (particularly on decentralization and clarity of roles and functions) as well as trust-building between management and staff. **All of these will be essential to the implementation of the recommendations from past-evaluations and those resulting from this Mission.**

V. MAINSTREAMING CONFLICT PREVENTION IN UNDP'S PROGRAMME PORTFOLIO AND UN SYSTEM INITIATIVES

Following the publication of the 2003 NHDR on the Colombian conflict, UNDP has progressively increased the size and scope of its conflict-related work. The REDES spearheaded those efforts, expanding its geographic scope and its range of activities in each territory, as well as supporting initiatives at the national level.

Although UNDP Colombia Country Programme 2004-2008 did include peace and development, this area of work essentially focused on a single initiative, the REDES programme and was not seen as critical to other work on democratic governance, poverty reduction and sustainable development. In other words, issues pertaining to conflict remained largely framed within the REDES programme, and program officers and partners in the other sectors lacked the tools and experience to ensure their initiatives effectively integrated conflict sensitive and peace building objectives, in spite of considerable capacity and expertise within the REDES and the NHDR teams. There have been many factors that limited the ability of REDES and the NHDR teams to lead the mainstreaming of conflict prevention between 2004 and today. The high

turn-over of senior staff, REDES's need to focus on the implementation of existing programmes, and the lack of a clear mandate and strategy slowed down progress in mainstreaming conflict prevention in UNDP's projects beyond the REDES initiative. There are however some examples of where this has been done and collaboration between REDES and other sections (democratic governance and poverty) has taken place. For example:

- Work with the regional employment councils which integrated conflict prevention objectives in its discussions and strategy to foster employment both for REDES and non REDES conflict affected areas. This work assured that discussion on the best strategies to foster employment included a discussion on its effects on the dynamics of conflict and vice-versa.
- The "local governance assessment" tools, developed with the support of the UNDP's Governance Regional Project, which incorporated conflict prevention measures in the tool, to generate awareness amongst local government and civil society and promote the design of responses that integrate conflict prevention through local institutional strengthening. It brought to the fore the importance of the role of the municipality as an actor of peace and engaged them into a conversation of how, within their existing competencies and through stronger local governance, they could contribute in building peace.

The development of a conflict prevention mainstreaming strategy for UNDP Colombia will need to draw from lessons that have been learnt globally in this field. In particular, they include:

BUILDING ON LESSONS FROM ELSEWHERE
<p>a) From strategy to action: While conflict elements tend to be incorporated into UN/UNDP planning processes, this is usually insufficient to ensure linkages with action on the ground. It is therefore critical to ensure that a conflict sensitive lens also informs the translation of the strategies into programming, from design to implementation. In this sense, conflict prevention should not be seen as a one-off exercise, but as a long-term overall approach to development programming.</p> <p>b) Start small: Starting small – with a focus on a limited number of projects – can prove a strategic approach in order to demonstrate impact and added value, and to create increasing buy-in within the Country Office. Possible criteria for identifying relevant initiatives include: the ability to monitor and evaluate projects; the geographic scope of the projects (including their possible implementation in conflict affected areas); the peace building or "Do No Harm" potential of particular initiatives; etc. A mapping of ongoing/planned initiatives on the basis of the above criteria and other relevant factors may prove an important first step in this direction.</p> <p>c) High-level commitment and adequate resourcing: Mainstreaming conflict prevention will require greater commitment from UNDP Country Offices to invest resources in project design and implementation, follow-up on agreed technical assistance, and in ensuring adequate support from BCPR on specific issues. In other words, to be successful, these initiatives will need to be championed by the senior management of UNDP Offices, and additional resources (both financial and human) should be provided to support their effective implementation.</p>

- d) ***In-house capacity:*** UNDP Country Office should use technical assistance in conflict prevention and conflict sensitive development to support, accompany and guide the implementation of a conflict prevention mainstreaming strategy. In this sense, an in-house capacity fully dedicated to these issues should be set up to oversee this process.
- e) ***Focus on practical tools and capacity development:*** UNDP staff, as well as partners, will need practical tools to integrate conflict prevention into their initiatives, throughout the programming cycle. The introduction of practical tools should be complemented by a targeted skills development programme which strengthens the capacity of staff in selected areas (e.g. conflict analysis; dialogue and other process skills; etc), as identified through a proper needs assessment.

The new UNDP Country Programme 2008-2011 places peace and development at the centre of UNDP's strategy in Colombia and therefore provides a unique opportunity to scale up efforts towards the mainstreaming of conflict prevention. In addition, as REDES moves to territorial programming and the methodology is increasingly seen as UNDP's approach for engaging at the local level, the potential for cross fertilization and integration will increase.

The added value of integrating conflict prevention and the awareness of the need for conflict sensitive humanitarian, early recovery and development were echoed by all programme staff at the workshop on conflict prevention mainstreaming which the mission facilitated⁵. Participants identified the following opportunities and challenges in taking this agenda forward.

PROGRAMME STAFF PERCEPTIONS OF KEY OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION MAINSTREAMING IN COLOMBIA	
Opportunities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP's proposed local level (territorial) approach • The promotion of an integrated vision with peace and conflict as a priority in the new UNDAF and UNDP's CDP • The articulation of the linkages between, on one hand, conflict prevention and democratic governance and poverty reduction, on the other • The potential for UNDP to take the leadership within the UN system on conflict prevention issues • Conflict analysis and actor mapping as entry points to design and implement local level programmes ensuring they are conflict sensitive • Inequality as a cross-cutting theme that could be used to develop programmes in Colombia and in conflict affected regions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP's past organizational culture of silos and

⁵ See Annex 3.

<p>Challenges</p>	<p>fragmented programming (including isolation of REDES from the rest of the programme)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The need for clear and openly stated political commitment and senior management leadership and prioritization of conflict prevention mainstreaming • The need to build capacity and tools for UNDP and key partners • Limited availability of practical and relevant tools to guide the mainstreaming of conflict prevention into programmes • Lack of a articulated strategy with roles and responsibilities for different programme staff, progress indicators and linkages to individual performance • Limited or no conflict analysis at sub-national level and limited integrated cross practice programme at national level
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RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONFLICT PREVENTION MAINSTREAMING

The BCPR/RBLAC Mission identified the mainstreaming of conflict prevention and integrated planning, especially at territorial level, *as the cornerstone of the future development of the UNDP programme at sub-national level and one that will give UNDP a comparative advantage vis a vis other UN agencies and a special role in the inter-agency early recovery cluster.* Progressive development of CO capacities (for conflict sensitive programming, for designing integrated responses that address some of the causes of conflict, for responses that “do no harm”, and address local needs, for projects designed in partnership and with participatory approaches, etc.) are all part of a comprehensive approach to conflict sensitive planning. This will also be essential for the positioning of UNDP in the the UN system.

1. UNDP Colombia **should scale up its efforts to mainstream conflict prevention** in its programmes, on the basis of the new Country Programme Document. This will require:

- a) A key role for **senior management** of the Country Office in championing this agenda, and in **leading the development and implementation of a conflict prevention mainstreaming strategy** within the office.
- b) UNDP Colombia should also take the lead in (a) facilitating the development of a common agenda on conflict sensitive practice for the UN Country Team, and (b) in offering key services and support to the UN system in this area.
- c) The mainstreaming agenda will require **adequate resourcing, both financial and human**, which will need to be allocated to support and guide the effective implementation of the strategy.

2. **UNDP should develop a strategy to mainstream conflict prevention.** The following elements of a conflict prevention mainstreaming strategy were identified by Programme Staff in the workshop and are endorsed by members of the Mission:

- a) **Set up of a task force chaired by the Deputy Resident Representative** and consisting of representatives from the various cluster areas and staff working in the territories to lead the development of the conflict prevention mainstreaming strategy for the Country Office.
- b) The task force should **develop an operational plan to support the integration of conflict prevention** into UNDP's approaches and initiatives. In particular, it should adopt an incremental approach, which will need to be reviewed and adapted regularly on the basis of agreed impact indicators.
- c) **The conflict mainstreaming strategy should be multi-pronged and include some of the elements below:**

-Development of *outcomes* and yearly outputs;

-A *capacity development* strategy to enhance understanding of conflict prevention, dialogue and process skills, conflict sensitive programming and early recovery approaches for UNDP, the UN system and partners;

-The progressive development of *targeted tools* to support the integration of conflict prevention concerns throughout the programming cycle and in other areas of UNDP's work (e.g. development of principles guiding all UNDP interventions in Colombia; guiding tools such as "conflict sensitive local governance programming" or conflict sensitive IDP and former combatant reintegration; practical easily accessible checklists for programming, including for the review of projects for LPAC processes; etc).

-Identification and launch of one or two *targeted pilot territorial initiatives* where all existing UNDP programmes initiatives can be brought together into a coherent framework; where staff can jointly undertake conflict sensitive planning and validate potential impacts of UNDP's initiatives on local conflict dynamics; development of joint progress indicators; etc.

-The launch of *targeted pilot activities focused on discreet initiatives of UNDP in other areas* (non peace and development cluster) of work, with a view to ensuring that these initiatives, from design to implementation, work towards reducing tensions and strengthening capacities for conflict prevention, and do not unintentionally exacerbate overt or latent conflict dynamics.

- d) **Capacity development of UNDP and UN staff in conflict prevention and conflict sensitive programming**

-In order to design the capacity development component of the strategy, UNDP Colombia should undertake a **needs assessment**, aimed at identifying the particular skills or competences which will strengthen the ability of UNDP staff to integrate conflict prevention in the design and implementation of their work. Initial consultations undertaken within the framework of the mission point to areas such as: conflict analysis, mainstreaming of conflict prevention into governance and poverty reduction, process and dialogue skills. In terms of supporting capacities of the UN system, UNDP can lead the organization and delivery of 2 to 3

workshops in the next 18 months aimed at enhancing understanding of the issues, commitment for joint efforts and identification of joint initiatives. The Early recover Cluster could be an important entry point.

- e) **Identification and implementation of integrated UNDP (joined up) activities at sub-national (territorial) level:** It would be important to undertake a mapping of current/planned initiatives, both at the national and local levels, against agreed criteria, to further ascertain the potential of selected programming to be included as pilots. In particular, possible criteria for the pilots include:

- Adequate space within the programming cycle of these initiatives to revise and review the work underway;
- Geographic scope of these initiatives (especially if targeting primarily conflict affected areas);
- Proposed level of interventions, especially as the sub-national level has been identified as a primary entry point to develop a coherent and conflict sensitive UNDP's approach to working in the territories;
- Potential of these initiatives to address conflict dynamics and/or to potentially cause harm;
- Explicit linkages between these initiatives and the key factors driving the conflict in Colombia, as laid out in the 2003 NHDR.

3. UNDP should play a inter-agency leadership in taking the conflict prevention mainstreaming agenda within the UN and with key Government counterparts.

- f) In the next 6 months, **UNDP Colombia should organize a workshop targeted at the UN Country Team, in order to initiate a discussion among the UN system on conflict prevention and conflict sensitive practice.** This workshop could provide a platform to develop a common language on conflict prevention and conflict sensitive practice, assess possible opportunities and constraints for the further development of joint efforts and, to identify possible entry points for a UN strategy on conflict prevention mainstreaming.
- g) **UNDP can play a leadership role in UN harmonization of conflict sensitive programming in conflict affected territories.** A leadership role will not necessarily mean a leading/high profile role as this could be done with a low key profile supporting another agency. In technical terms, however, UNDP can support efforts to identify joint projects (with clear and visible deliverables and short-medium term time frame) to identify potential harmonization of approaches, enhanced programmatic coordination in the territories, with a view to facilitating better inter-agency complementarities in the territories including agreements on communities that will have interventions. This will considerably enhance the impact of UN projects and programmes, possibly help identify whether joint operational agreements are possible. The potential of having joint offices in the territories may facilitate this.

The capacities in conflict mainstreaming should also be a key component of the “offer of services” of UNDP Colombia towards Government counterpart when designing new projects and/or adjusting existing one.

VI. CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND TERRITORIAL APPROACHES

The 2003 Colombia National Human Development Report, “El Conflicto, Callejón con salida”, provided a comprehensive analysis of the armed conflict, and identified the conflict as the primary obstacle to human development in the country. In many ways, the NHDR 2003 was a watershed in Colombia, in the sense that:

- a) It became, and still is, a reference document for a comprehensive and thorough analysis of the armed conflict in Colombia and continues to serve as the framework to raise awareness on elements of the conflict, including through UNDP’s newsletter “Hechos del Callejón”;
- b) It proved a useful advocacy tool for UNDP and a unique platform to open up spaces for policy dialogues with key national and local stakeholders on issues pertaining to peace and conflict in Colombia;
- c) It also provided innovative approaches to improve human development and local governance, some of which were taken forward by UNDP Colombia, in particular through the creation of the REDES programme in 2003. According to the NHDR, initiatives such as REDES should work toward tackling the conflict in a comprehensive way and be geared towards its regional dynamics, while encouraging policies which protect people and promote peace and discourage those which, intentionally or not, fuel the armed conflict and violent practices.

However, the Mission also noted that:

- d) Conflict dynamics have changed over the last 4 years, both as a result of changes in the dynamics of conflict and the impact of the GoC’s conflict management policies. As the NHDR did not aim to provide a localized analysis conflict analysis, UNDP’s knowledge and understanding of meso- and micro-levels conflict dynamics are not sufficiently comprehensive or operational for the purposes of programme planning.
- e) There is currently a need to update conflict analysis with greater feedback from the territories in order to ensure (i) UNDP’s upstream activities (inputs and contribution to national policies and national processes on peace-building, early recovery, etc) are informed by local perspectives, including their nuances and complexities, as well as that tensions resulting from the different interests of stakeholders are well understood.

While the conflict analysis undertaken within the framework of the 2003 NHDR proved instrumental in positioning UNDP on issues pertaining to peace and conflict, it also became apparent to the BCPR/RBLAC mission that **this analysis needs to be taken forward at sub-national level and with a stronger programmatic**

focus. At the moment, there are a number of knowledge gaps that need addressing⁶ to provide the analytical background required for effective operational programming for the REDES and other UN programmes in the context of early recovery, recovery and peace-building. In particular, this would include:

- a) As there is a lack of specific regional studies of the conflict (despite readily available analysis of the national level dynamics), it will be necessary to sponsor regional participatory conflict analysis to consolidate community awareness and to promote consensus-based strategies as a way to overcome violence and better assess peace building initiatives.
- b) The presence of the armed conflict has obliterated other social tensions and dynamics existing in Colombia, most of which are at a lower level of relevance but are nevertheless important in terms of constituting barriers for effective development outcomes. Examples of these include tensions emerging in the context of access, use and management of natural resources by indigenous and non-indigenous communities. There other forms of conflict or “conflictividad” in Colombia that need to be well understand and addressed for a number of reasons:
 - a) They have an impact on development and development interventions can alleviate or exacerbate those dynamics;
 - b) UNDP’s programme needs to make better linkages between a range of social tensions and the continuum of violence, in order to ensure interventions are relevant as conflict related issues span across a range of contexts and situations, including armed conflict.
 - c) There is a need for targeted and flexible approaches to undertake multi-stake holder processes of conflict analysis in order to respond to various contexts and programmatic needs.

There is also an urgent need to increase the capacity of the P&D Cluster in terms of continued monitoring of national and sub-national conflict dynamics and to provide substantive analytical inputs to support programming and guide monitoring and evaluation, with a view to avoiding a piecemeal reactive analysis.
- c) d) There is an important overlap and potential interface between information and analysis that could be significantly increased if linkages between the three functions of conflict analysis, best practices and monitoring and evaluation are brought close together (see recommendations on the P&D Cluster). These activities should be brought together (ideally functionally) in a manner in which they support and reinforce each other and UNDP’s programmes. A stronger information and analytical function with a broader remit to undertake conflict analysis monitoring and updating, good practices and M&E would be essential for evidence based development of territorial programmes and to support the RC’s efforts. e) The Good Practices initiative could be expanded to include both good

⁶ As evidenced in the workshop on conflict analysis facilitated by the mission, conflict analysis is understood by staff in many different ways. Independently of the model/approach to be chosen by the CO, tools will be required for the teams based on the framework provided by the NHDR 2003.

practices of civil society and partners, as well as good programming practices from UNDP that could be further applied in-country as well as globally.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT

- a) **Conflict analysis** (for which there are many approaches and methodologies) **should underpin all of UNDP's programme design activities at the sub-national level.** In particular:
- UNDP Colombia should use conflict analysis methodologies and processes as entry points for planning and programme design in conflict affected territories and, as entry points for joint planning in non conflict affected territories.
 - This process of joint analysis and planning should also contribute to further streamline UNDP's approach for engaging at the territorial level, across the board.
 - In conflict affected territories where there is a presence of the REDES programme, UNDP should use existing consultative/participatory mechanisms to undertake multi-stakeholder conflict analysis processes.
 - In territories where UNDP does not have a REDES programme, a lighter version of conflict analysis could be undertaken as the basis for joint inter-practice programming.
 - The REDES methodology could be used as an "approach" for a multi-stakeholder conflict analysis process in addition to other complementary methodologies which have been used elsewhere, and the National Human Development process.
- b) UNDP Colombia should develop **a phased approach to the development of territorial programmes, on the basis of conflict analysis.** In particular, it is recommended that 2 sub-national conflict analyses are undertaken in the first year (one REDES and one non-REDES regions), then expanded to 4 territories in the second year. Nariño and Soacha could be the first territories to undertake this approach.
- c) For other regions of Colombia affected by various forms of violence, **UNDP could consider developing an ongoing conflict monitoring system,** which will allow for a better understanding of the conflict dynamics at the sub-national level, and for scenario planning. It will also directly guide programming and interventions in these areas, notably by helping to focus the strategy, determine baselines and measure impact.
- While being adapted to local contexts, the conflict monitoring could draw on the broader conflict indicators which were developed in the context of the NHDR, to provide an assessment of key conflict driver (displacement, drug trafficking, recruitment, etc), dynamics and trends. It could also draw from other methodologies developed in the region (such as the PAPEP project) as well as globally, in order to produce regular monitoring of the conflict situation in selected territories. This conflict monitoring should also provide a capacity assessment to better ascertain the type of partnerships which the UN and UNDP could build, in the context of changing dynamics and evolving scenarios.

- UNDP's conflict monitoring could be an important contribution to UN inter-agency processes and will complement OCHA's monitoring of the humanitarian situation. In many ways, this product could be positioned as another service that UNDP could offer to the UN Country Team, within a wider conflict prevention mainstreaming strategy.
- d) Within the framework of a wider conflict prevention mainstreaming strategy (see above), UNDP could consider developing **a conflict analysis toolkit for UNDP and other national and international partners**. The toolkit could cover a range of options and practical tools, for example, checklist for programming; regional profiles; thematic based elements (e.g. environment and conflict sensitivity), etc.
 - e) UNDP should consider **recruiting a full time conflict analysis adviser** to monitor trends, support the documentation of regional conflict analysis processes, produce regular updates for the UN system and liaise/link with M&E and good practices specialist for the production of relevant information. He/she will also contribute to further position UNDP as the leader in the area of conflict prevention and conflict analysis. While this staff should be based in the Peace and Development Cluster, his/her work will seek to support the entire CO and all programme streams and to provide analysis on the sub-national context to the RC and the Country Team.
 - f) Documentation of **good practices should be expanded to encompass UNDP's interventions** with a focus on issues/indicators that can contribute to institutional learning at local, national and global levels, including implementation issues.
 - g) UNDP should also organize **a conflict training building workshop** for the UNDP and UN staff as part of the wider conflict mainstreaming capacity development approach (see above).

VII. EARLY RECOVERY

In September 2006, upon request of the IASC, an inter-agency mission to Colombia explored the possible application of the Cluster Approach. The Inter-Agency mission found that:

- The humanitarian situation in Colombia was very serious;
- The Government was the main provider of humanitarian assistance with considerable resources and a comprehensive legal framework and institutional structure to support the humanitarian response;
- A considerable gap existed between provisions in the legal framework and implementation at the departmental and municipal levels;
- There was a need for greater cohesion amongst members of the international humanitarian community to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the overall response and some of the weaknesses of domestic protection structures (including Early Warning mechanisms, and the lack of adequate housing and livelihood support⁷ for IDPs, and problems related to restrictions on freedom of movement) were acknowledged;

⁷ This was also identified by the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs.
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- Unresolved land rights issues, the lack of reparations, the dangers posed by landmines and unexploded ordnance, (including the need to strengthen mine action programmes) continued to be a serious problem;
- The UNCT should establish an IASC Early Recovery Thematic Group to ensure that humanitarian programmes included adequate attention to the early recovery needs of affected populations. The Group should be jointly led by UNDP and IOM, to help ensure appropriate linkages between humanitarian programmes and longer term development initiatives. Key areas of concern which were brought to the attention of the mission included the need for effective strategies to ensure sustainable livelihoods, access to land, and access to basic social services.
- The Early Recovery Thematic Group should carry out a more detailed gap analysis and ensure that strategies are developed by the relevant Thematic and Sector Groups to address these, with clear benchmarks, indicators and timeframes, to be incorporated into the Humanitarian Country Team Action Plan for 2007.
- Stronger field presence, promotion of area-specific and community specific approaches, more focus on capacity building for local actors and institutions.

UNDP Colombia developed a strategy to support Early-Recovery (ER) on the basis of the recommendations of the inter-agency mission. The strategy “regards Early Recovery as an opportunity to minimize risks and vulnerabilities, setting the conditions for a sustainable human development. Vulnerability is due primarily to risk, uncertainty and lack of security; insofar as ER tries to stabilize human security⁸ and confront the underlying risks contributing to the crisis, ER strategies may contribute to rebuilding trust in societies affected by conflict, thus reducing the obstacles for reconciliation and recovery. This is why speaking of ER in the Colombian context also implies considering aspects associated with the dynamics of an on-going armed conflict, the need to consider the conflict’s causes and effects, given that these factors could seriously affect the sustainability of recovery efforts.

In this sense, ER seeks to support the social and economic reintegration of populations affected by the crisis, so that these populations may obtain the necessary and sustainable means for living with dignity and for becoming pro-active actors in the construction of a peaceful society. This underlines the importance of ownership on the part of the affected communities and of partnership with State institutions, so that the ER approach can become part of the components leading to better governance and the local formulation of public policies for peace consolidation and equitable development.

Against this background, **UNDP’s approach to early recovery should be two-fold: (i) as a co-Chair and co-cluster leader in the inter-agency process and, (ii) as a development agency in its own right implementing recovery (including ER) programmes on the ground with concrete and visible activities** in areas such as community-based reintegration and reconciliation, local level economic recovery approaches, action against landmines, transitional justice,

⁸ *Stabilization* is defined as the process whereby underlying tensions - that could lead to the recurrence of violence and to failure in mechanisms for peaceful conflict transformation - are managed and reduced, while efforts to create preconditions for a successful long-term development are carried out.

and disaster preparedness. While UNDP's own programming needs to be well communicated and coordinated with other UN agencies, the development of an operational concrete programme in the affected territories should be UNDP's top priority in the next phase of its conflict related programming.⁹

On the basis of various consultations with key stakeholders during the course of the BCPR/RBLAC mission, the following observations emerged regarding UNDP's approach and future work on early recovery:

- Clearly, early recovery in Colombia, in both its conceptualization and its programs must be adapted to the particular needs of the country. As mentioned by the IASC mission, existing governmental programs from the national, regional and local levels are essential actors in the humanitarian field and more so even in ER. Also, the fact that the conflict is on-going and dynamic capable of moving from one region to another also poses important challenges to ER work. Consequently, some ER work, when carried out in conjunction or right after military operations can be perceived as part of military campaigns. In this context, each ER intervention must clearly ensure that it is conflict sensitive, based on a good understanding of local conflict dynamics.
- The recent local and regional elections and the process of developing local development plans for the next 4 years, provide an important opportunity for UNDP and the local ER working groups to influence those plans and partner with the government. The role of the group and humanitarian actors working in ER is therefore to either support the implementation of those programs or to fill important gaps, especially in priority regions.
- Given the ample terrain for ER work in Colombia, the installed capacity of the State and the important presence of cooperation, notably USAID and IOM, it is important to develop clear criteria for UNDP intervention, to ensure maximum impact. Those criteria must be explicit and guide the development of on-going and future plans for ER.
- The thematic clusters at the national and local levels remain weak and with limited capacity to provide for a strategic framework, establish alliances with other actors to foster a good division of labor and to design criteria for interventions. Those groups will need to work, on the basis of solid conflict analysis at the regional and local levels.
- While UNDP has actively supported the inter-agency cluster, it has not been seen as taking its leadership role in strategically defining the ER work of the UN. It has also not been clear as to what UNDP could offer, where its comparative advantage are (beyond the broad objectives of its ER work contained in the Strategy). This may be partly the result of lack of clarity between the mandates and roles of UNDP, the work of other UN agencies, especially OCHA. It could also result from a lack of concrete programming on the ground, in line with UNDP's traditional mandate.
- A proposed joint UN programme has considerably progressed in Nariño (primarily under the OCHA leadership) and this has helped identify areas of

⁹ UNDP Colombia (2007), UNDP Colombia Early recovery Strategy 1st Draft v. 26/07/2007.p. 5
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work and bring together agencies to begin identifying priorities. A gap in the evolving design is the sufficient consideration of ongoing existing plans/programmes (both governmental and non-governmental). As the UN will always be a smaller player (including in relation to the GoC), it will be important to identify where its limited resources will be most strategically invested and how to build upon the comparative advantage of various UN agencies. Nariño provides a very good platform for future actions but, as in other regions, this will require specialized capacity to carry out work in this area. UNDP should ensure that it has the capacities to contribute to the programme and to lead with effective field level implementation, in addition to the local level cluster coordination.

- The sub-national (regional) thematic cluster groups are still defining their purpose and the scope of their work; their precise contribution to ER remains vague.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON EARLY RECOVERY

In light of the above, the BCPR/RBLAC mission would like to recommend that:

1) UNDP should re-focus its contribution to ER ensuring it has both a strong presence in inter-agency processes and develops a UNDP ER programme in selected territories. For the latter, UNDP will need to develop criteria for programme expansion in the territories, agree on key programme areas and define how best to link with REDES and other ongoing initiatives. In particular it is recommended that UNDP:

Recommendations for joint programming:

- a. Representation and staffing of UNDP's ER initiatives could be split up. To assure **effective UNDP leadership in the IASC Cluster meetings, UNDP should ensure representation at the level of Country Director or Deputy Country Director.** The peace and development area should closely support this function. The high-level representation will also allow greater engagement by other areas of UNDP. For the purpose of UNDP's own programme, the programme specialist and the senior recovery adviser will be key in defining programming and support at sub-national level.
- b. UNDP needs to urgently clarify and clearly differentiate when participating in joint projects what its role is as Cluster co-lead and as implementing technical assistance and programmes in ER contexts.
- c. In the same way, when UNDP contributes to and works within a joint Programme Framework **at sub-national level, UNDP needs to have its own single agency programme and delivery strategy** including its own staff and project implementation mechanisms unless, of course, there is a decision in the IASC that joint management and joint implementation will be used.
- d. **All joint initiatives should be carefully designed to take into account the new local and regional development plans.** A mapping of activities is essential and, only on the basis of this mapping, should joint programs be developed.

- e. Agencies should provide accompaniment to local and regional authorities?? as they develop their ER plans.
- f. While an ER Framework at sub-national level is all encompassing and brings together all main actors (UN, NGOs, local government, etc) **in the context of UN agency joint projects, only those agencies directly involved in programme design and implementation should be involved in and agree on the most appropriate delivery mechanisms, programme implementation coordination and sequencing of activities, including the use of conflict sensitive methodologies.** Management and implementation structures are aimed at supporting the implementation or execution of a project. Joint programming could use a number of different delivery modalities.

Recommendations for UNDP's Early Recovery Programming:

- b) UNDP's **own programme in early recovery needs to be strengthened and further developed** to give the agency a comparative advantage in the field and capitalize on UNDP's own areas of expertise.
 - a. **UNDP (in close consultation with other agencies and partners) should produce a road map/process to develop UNDP's own programme** (firewalled from the inter-agency cluster) although well coordinated with other agencies. Transparency is essential.
 - b. The **UNDP program could establish a partnership with OCHA on knowledge management and advocacy at the national and local levels** with particular emphasis in the mechanisms which allow information from the local level to feed in national advocacy work and on issue based studies such as IDPs.
 - c. All early recovery and peace orientated programming will need to have **gender related outcomes and a strategy for mainstreaming** gender (as part of territorial ER programming) will need to be developed. To achieve this UNDP should consider:
 - i. **Hiring a gender expert** to provide programme support across the Peace and Development and other clusters. He or she will also design gender sensitive impact indicators and link initiatives on civil society (women's organizations) to other areas of programming;
 - ii. **Build staff awareness and capacities through training on gender issues in crisis and conflict**
 - iii. Integrate gender objectives into Programme staff RCAs as a measure of individual responsibility
 - d. **UNDP's programme should privilege upstream assistance rather than direct implementation of ER activities.** ER programming could include the following elements.

- i. **Technical support** to local actors (and as a contribution to inter-agency efforts) including local government authorities on **mapping and costing ER activities** at local level;
 - ii. **Technical assistance for reviewing plans and programs of all actors**, notably NGOs, and bilateral cooperation to ensure coherence and maximization in the use of resources;
 - iii. Support to **needs assessment, monitoring and impact assessment, advocacy and policy dialogue, technical assistance** to key partners and accompaniment on thematic and territorial ER projects, especially in areas and regions where UNDP has installed capacity;
 - iv. In terms of service lines, **programmatic activities should be clearly** identified with UNDP's mandate and areas of expertise. For example, capacity strengthening of local authorities and civil society, better interface between local authorities and communities; strengthening economic recovery strategies and IDP reintegration; mainstreaming and capacity building on mine actions, etc.
 - v. **UNDP should include specific advisory services to Accion Social on how to define ER** and how to raise resources for this.
- e. In order to strengthen UNDP's capacity and a programme is developed at sub-national level, UNDP should **hire a Senior Rec Recovery Adviser. She/he could leads the team working on Recovery issues** (including managing mine action and reintegration specialists, design UNDP's responses and those developed in partnership with other agencies and ensure full integration of protection, IDPs, mine action and reintegration activities at territorial level.

VIII. UNDP'S PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT CLUSTER

In first quarter of 2007, UNDP's Senior Management engaged in a restructuring process that would rationalize project/programmatic activities and facilitate the delivery of the UNDP CPD. Given the fluidity and complexity of the Colombian context, UNDP's management needed a structure that could deliver a long term strategic and programmatic vision and, at the same time, respond to short-term issues affecting the country. The restructuring process included the implementation of a number of internal changes reorganizing UNDP's programme in three pillars: Governance, Poverty Reduction and Peace and Development. The new structure had an impact on all Project activities associated with peace and development including the REDES programme. Thus, the Peace and Development Cluster was established in 2007, following the finalization of the new Country Programme Document for Colombia.

Although peace and development were important objectives in the previous CPD, they were largely treated as one "large project", centered on the REDES programme. As the work of REDES received increasing recognition, combined with the progress of the London-Cartagena- Bogota process, UNDP received more demands to support conflict prevention activities, processes and analysis both at national and local levels. The growing demand on UNDP meant that interventions in the regions where the REDES programme was active had to be increasingly internally coordinated. The

management of the CO therefore decided to shift the management and co-ordination of new regional strategic initiatives such as ART-GOLD under the management of the REDES coordinator as they will be implemented in conflict affected regions (although without an *explicit* conflict prevention objective).

At the same time, the RC's office in its role of coordinating peace and development within the UN system and vis-a-vis the GoC, has gradually started to bring on board the Coordinator of UNDP's REDES/Peace and Development Cluster to provide strategic advice (primarily on territorial issues) in support and complement to the substantive work of the DPA Peace and Development Adviser. This will now also be additionally supported by a Strategic Planner.

This restructuring of the management and location of projects is a very positive and welcomed initiative as it consolidated thematic CPR/Conflict issues and brought together the teams in charge of relevant programmes and projects. Up to 62 projects –out of which only 19 are active-were brought together. These changes forced UNDP to think on conflict and peace related programming beyond the REDES program. This is, in addition to REDES related initiatives (which remains center-piece of UNDP's activities), the peace and development cluster will be complemented by other strategies and instruments in recovery, transitional justice, reintegration and reconciliation, etc. *Furthermore, the restructuring requires a serious assessment of how to successfully integrate the REDES approach (participatory-multi-stakeholder processes for peace building at local level) and the REDES programme activities to newly emerging projects.* Increasingly, the quality and impact of the peace and development work of the CO will depend on the extent to which the CO understands REDES as an approach rather than a single project or program.

The new Peace and development Cluster has become the largest team in the CO with a broad programme of work spanning at national and sub-national levels. Issues of project design and implementation, effective procurement and delivery, project and programme planning and monitoring and evaluation, base-line data of regions as well as capacity development of staff and ensuring effective management become new challenges that require urgent addressing to ensure UNDP delivers to communities, the UN system and donors. There are huge expectations on what the P&D Cluster and UNDP Country Office will deliver. Efforts are required to strengthen management capacities, effective systems and procedures as well as internal cluster coordination and personnel capacities for UNDP to remain a lead agency and to capitalize on its distinctive approaches and experiences.

Internal changes in the team structure were accompanied with a strategy to expand UNDP's presence in 5 strategically selected territories, all of them where REDES programme had been present to date. The proposed expansion of the programme raised expectations with government' and civil society partners which, in turn, raised the interest of donors and other UN Agencies. For example, UNDP has mobilized new resources in 2007 from the Swedish Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Canadian Cooperation (CIDA), Accion Social (GoC's social and economic investment branch for recovered territories), and there are others projects in the pipeline.

THE CHANGE MANAGEMENT PROCESS

The following observations on UNDP's restructuring process and capacity needs in the Area of Peace and Development result from extensive consultations between the

Mission and the Peace and Development Team, the CO management, Operations and other Programme staff.

It is clear that the restructuring process will lead to a more cohesive programmatic approach, with the REDES programme providing a solid foundation for new interventions in the territories, both for UNDP and the UN system. However, internal adaptation to this new structure and the changed working processes have led to strains amongst team members, work processes and operational structures, along with increased responsibilities for most of the team members who are trying to adapt to the new structure and cope with ongoing and new responsibilities. The strain in increased responsibilities has also impacted capacities for coordination within the Peace and Development Cluster Team as they need to develop new programmes in the territories in addition to ongoing activities at central and territorial levels, without the necessary management tools or the best structure to sustain their engagement in the long term.

Key issues highlighted by the consultations include:

- The strategy to expand requires careful prioritization and phasing focusing on strategic visible results in the short-medium term. Pacing the growth of UNDP's Peace and Development agenda and programmatic portfolio – in other words, not going too fast- could have positive implications, fewer risks in the implementation, enabling the CO senior management and the team to have better control over the change and expansion process, while seeking continuously the delicate balance between the demands of accompanying REDES processes and implementing other project activities.
- There may be a need to review the structure of the Peace and Development Cluster to ensure that it responds to the management of results for a large programme (and a large team) including strengthening the management section to liberate the P&D Cluster Co-coordinator to play a strategic role in directing the team and work-programme.
- The merger of previously independent teams into one larger structure requires a) improved capacity for strategic and operational coordination in the context of change management; b) enhanced information flows between sub-programmes and greater clarity and systematic communication with the team in terms of what the deliverables are; and c) review of the roles and responsibilities of team members and the development of work-plans with clear results for individuals.
- Improved coordination between the Peace and Development Cluster and other programmes and a proactive role for senior management of the CO in serving as bridge between the three program areas. The role of the Deputy Country Director is seen a key to achieve greater coherence and alignment between programmes. While coordination mechanisms are in place, it may be necessary to identify additional requirements for management support.
- The internal management structure that was put in place to manage the Peace and Development Cluster (with the creation of middle management positions) is seen as facilitating the expansion towards territorial programming and the implementation of the ongoing projects. However, team building and ongoing planning exercises (at more operational level) are not

perceived as sufficient to provide a common space for consensus building, information sharing, learning and consolidating the team's ongoing and new initiatives. Staff also highlighted the value of ensuring formal and informal processes for staff to enhance knowledge on areas required for effective delivery and to continue to generate a supportive and flexible environment.

- Within the new structure, responsibilities for field level coordination of UNDP's work rests with territorial coordinators. While this is perceived as a move in the right direction, strengthened management support and engagement with local teams based in the territories may require more systematic engagement (e.g. quarterly meetings) ideally in each territorial office, from staff based in Bogota. The Mission Team sees the value in increasing the presence (missions) of middle management and specialists in the territories for planning, monitoring, evaluation and programme design purposes. Greater interaction and more solid presence will facilitate understanding of key management decisions and support a more effective two-way information flow.
- Currently there are three different modalities of territorial offices: REDES (Huila, Montes de Maria, Meta), Interagency (Nariño) and UNDP. Staff also suggested that refinement of the role and responsibilities of the different types of offices particularly reporting and the relationship with the P&D Cluster, as well as their delivery and coordination role would be important.

DELIVERY CAPACITY

- The expansion the Area of Peace has increased its financial portfolio to about 62 projects and from an initial contribution of \$ 500,000 from BCPR in 2004 to a US\$ 13 million mobilized in three years. The administrative team that supports this operation has been working with a minimum human support structure, increased implementation demands from a new expanding territorial operation without the optimal internal country office mechanisms to provide services. While the operations support team has been gradually strengthened, increasing the speed of delivery is still a challenge as expectations from donors and partners are high.
- While the team has responded well and with a degree of success, knowledge of decentralized operations under DEX mode, and/or guidelines, tools and systems for the implementation of projects in crisis situations could be strengthened.
- Shifting from a small operation to an expanding provision of administrative services could benefit from planning process that seeks complementarities between administrative and technical teams. This has proved very effective in other COs where working modalities shift quickly and an enhanced understanding of programming requirements by operations (as a result of joint planning) has led to shift towards solution oriented ways of delivering the programme.
- Staff stressed on many occasions the need for flexibility as the context in which the programme operates requires finding solutions to ensure responses to a range of complex and at times un-planned demands (including one off cases). There may be a value in undertaking an exercise to identify the range

of demands and response options to facilitate effective managing in line with UNDP's rules and regulations and efficient delivery.

- The Cluster and Area Coordinators could benefit from increased administrative support. There are financial and operational modalities of delivery that would enable greater responsiveness and flexibility without negatively impacting on accountability. This is essential given the very dynamic context in which the UNDP territorial offices will operate.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT CLUSTER

UNDP has undertaken an impressive and commendable management change process that has led to the creation of the Peace and Development Cluster. Proposed (and implemented) changes will enable the expansion and delivery of the territorial and national level programmes on conflict and peace. **The Mission believes that strengthening of the structure, planning processes and administrative systems/procedures is essential for an effective delivery of the programme. As importantly, a strong and well functioning Peace and Development Cluster will facilitate the further positioning of UNDP as a key player on conflict and peace issues vis a vis the UN system, strengthen its capacity to provide substantive inputs into the RC system and the UNCT and facilitate voices from the region in national policy making.**

ENHANCED AND EXPANDED PLANNING PROCESSES

- a) With a complex programme and delivery structure in the territories, planning processes are a key tool for management to ensure effective articulation at horizontal and vertical levels, agreement on common strategic priorities and deliverables as well as improved ownership of the overall programme by all involved. The Mission believes that a strengthened planning process would be an important way of solidifying the change process. To this end, it is recommended that:
 - a. At least once a year a territorial planning process engaging all clusters of UNDP programming in particular territories. This could help better articulation between the national and territorial levels so that local issues/voices may have stronger channels for public policy.
 - b. At least twice yearly planning exercises that include a sub-national level including: short-term analysis (providing opportunities to exchange information on different territories), review programmes of work and concrete deliverables, analysis of progress in improving procurement systems, etc.
 - c. In addition, the planning process could have a particular focus on enhancing articulation of different UNDP's projects (REDES, Peace and Development Cluster, other Clusters) and how best to coordinate them vis a vis UNDP's engagement with local partners an consultative processes. A territory based calendar of events, activities and missions, as well as payment and procurement schedules may be a useful tool.

Structure, roles and responsibilities of the Peace and Development Cluster

- b) It may be useful to take stock of the functioning of the Peace and Development Cluster and consider that it could benefit from further refinement of the structure and, above all, refinement of the roles and responsibilities of individual staff. If the CO decides to review the structure, it may be useful to see how functional roles of different sub-teams could be structurally strengthened so as to ensure there is coherence between territorial and thematic activities.
- a. From a functional perspective, it may be useful to consider organizing the work under the following teams:
- i. Coordination Office (coordinator, assistant and outreach specialist);
 - ii. Knowledge Management Team (Conflict Analysis Specialist, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, Good Practices Specialist and Analysts x2) (With a cross cutting function servicing the entire Cluster)
 - iii. Implementation Support Team (Operations Specialist, programme Officer, programme Assistant) (With a cross cutting function servicing the whole Cluster)
 - iv. Reconciliation and Transitional Justice Team (Transitional Justice Adviser, Senior reconciliation Adviser, Civil Society Specialist, coordination Specialist) (With a thematic policy and programme advisory role, programme development and management of national activities, coordination with other actors)
 - v. Recovery Team (Early recovery Adviser, Early recovery Specialist, Reintegration Specialist, Mine Action Specialist) (With a thematic policy and programme advisory role, programme development, early recovery TA in the territories, and management of national activities, coordination with other actors)
 - vi. Territorial Team (Coordinator of regional Programmes, Meta Coordinator and team, Oriente Antioqueno Coordinator and Team, Montes de Maria Coordinator and Team, Huila Coordinator and Team, Narino Coordinator and team (With a regional role focused on accompaniment of actors project implementation and monitoring, feedback back inputs to thematic and national processes, etc)
- c) Staff also highlighted the value of reviewing and, if necessary, adjusting the TOR's of staff in order to ensure clarity on deliverables and roles of different levels of management.

STRENGTHENING ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY

- d) Existent mechanisms, processes and workflows for delivery need reviewing and strengthening, including the effective introduction of DEX and crisis related instruments so that UNDP is able to cut down procurement-delivery time. **Training for UNDP CO Operations staff and relevant staff in the Peace and Development Cluster should be prioritized.**

- e) The P&D **Cluster could consider appointing an experienced operations/administrative officer**, with experience in UNDP NEX/DEX project implementation. He/she could take a lead role in financial, administrative and operational matters under the supervision of the Cluster Coordinator.
- f) The CO could consider strengthening the use of management tools and processes including:
 - a. Establishment of mechanisms for monitoring and ongoing “early warning” audit (as it has been done in other LAC COs) to ensure early identification of potential problems in financial and project management.
 - b. Adaptation for the CO of a local operations manual based CO’s needs and the most recent UNDP DEX and NEX manuals to ensure the CO is familiar and up to date with the range procurement, disbursement and financial management options developed by UNDP for crisis contexts.
 - c. Development of field mission guidelines/protocols on communication with local counter-parts for staff based in the territories [not related to security protocols]. This may include, for example, inter-practice Missions, integrated UN Missions to the territories, identification of local government focal points, management of UNDP’s information and external communications, etc.

VIII. POSSIBLE AREAS OF SUPPORT FROM BCPR/RBLAC (EPL)

The following areas of support could be considered by BCPR as part of a broader Partnership Agreement. Recommendations for support resulting from this mission will be integrated into the Partnership Strategy and final decision for BCPR’s engagement will also depend upon findings and recommendations from the missions on Mine Action and Reintegration. It is expected that the Partnership Framework will be completed by the end of April 2008.

BCPR will work with the CO and the RBLAC in the design a follow-up implementation strategy on the basis of the Partnership Agreement.

It is envisaged that 3 types of support can be provided by BCPR:

- Overall CPR technical assistance from BCPR for the implementation of the Partnership Strategy;
- A financial contribution in line with the Partnership Strategy;
- Support to the Country Office on specific activities such as mainstreaming conflict sensitivity, conflict analysis, mainstreaming gender; support for early recovery; mine action; and reintegration programming.

In particular, it is recommended that BCPR provides financial and technical support for:

- a) The development of a conflict mainstreaming strategy including workshop(s) for UNDP staff and the UN system; review of such a strategy and seed support for pilot initiatives;
- b) Support and training on dialogue and process skills, especially for local operators’.

- c) Development of Conflict Analysis process in 4 territories and conflict monitoring and scenario planning. This could include, inter-alia payment for consultants; development of tools, training, etc.
- d) Support for gender mainstreaming including technical support, development of a set of activities on gender empowerment and pilot initiatives to integrate gender outcomes/outputs into territorial projects;
- e) Development of knowledge products aimed at systematizing lessons learnt from REDES activities.
- f) Technical Assistance for the CO to strengthen operations and delivery capacity of the Peace and Development Cluster.

Financial support to bring international or national specialist staff in the following areas:

- g) A conflict prevention advisor;
- h) A Senior Recovery Adviser;
- i) A Senior Gender and CPR Adviser
- j) In addition, it is likely that the 2 additional technical Missions will recommend the recruitment of 2 specialists on mine action and reintegration.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1

Terms of Reference for Mainstreaming CPR Mission

Background

The REDES Programme was developed as an initiative to address conflict, on the understanding that in the midst of conflict it is not only possible but imperative to undertake human development initiatives parallel to humanitarian responses. According to the Colombia National Human Development Report 2003 (NHDR) such initiatives are aimed at: a) working on conflict dynamics in a comprehensive way at national and sub-national/regional levels; b) encouraging the development of policies that protect victims and affected communities and promote peace; d) discourage sectors or interventions that, intentionally or not, fuel the armed conflict and violent practices. The objective of REDES is to: *Contribute to reduce the conflict in Colombia through the participation of civil society at the regional level and promote comprehensive human development initiatives in the middle of the conflict.*

The different manifestations of the crisis related to the armed conflict in Colombia are not only of a humanitarian nature but represent unresolved development problems. All development actions, current and future, can potentially increase or decrease the risks of conflict. While it is now recognized that conflict can have a negative impact on the development of the country, it is less clear how development itself can fuel tensions and/or violence. This complex relationship needs to be examined so as to ensure the right development strategies are promoted. In particular, those that impact positively on the crisis and use the crisis as an opportunity to redirect development efforts.

So far, in Colombia, development planning tends to be isolated from conflict response planning and, there is a tendency to conceptualize and plan development as if there was no relationship between development and the risks associated with armed conflict. The manifestations and impact of the crisis, such as internal displacement, insecurity and/or land mines, are mostly addressed as a humanitarian problem and not as having major developmental dimensions. This has led to a divorce between, on the one hand, development interventions and, on the other, humanitarian responses with the resulting gap in addressing and contributing to decrease the risks associated with armed conflict.

In trying to address all the above, UNDP Colombia has initiated a process of restructuring creating four Programmatic Areas, 1) Poverty, 2) Governance, 3) Sustainable Economic Development, and 4) Peace, Development and Reconciliation (PDR), where REDES has engaged in an increased scope of coordination role, and supports the implementation of an expanded decentralized territorial operation of UNDP's Peace, Development and Reconciliation Programme. At the local level, UNDP is opening five inter-agency sub-regional offices that will promote higher levels of participation of local actors and stakeholders, in development planning processes therefore enhancing the operational and administrative capacity to respond to central and local driven demands. In order to deliver a more coherent and integrated package of institutional services, it has launched a process to adjust/review its country program so that it articulates integrated approaches for peace, economic development, citizen's participation, where it is key to explicitly mainstreaming conflict risk management considerations and address the causes of conflict. At the

centre of the adjustments is enhancing Areas capacity to deliver in practice the institutional "package of services". All of this adjustment process will conclude with a review of the Country Program Document.

The PDR Programme Area, with the central participation of the REDES team is designing and promoting two efforts: 1. A capacity building strategy aimed at mainstreaming *conflict sensitive approaches*¹⁰ for development, humanitarian action and peace building, and reintegration within the UNDP and the wider UN System; and, 2. A Colombian Peace and Conflict Analysis Tool. This initiative coincides with REDES second phase of operations (2007-2009), which comprises of new lines of services, an expansion in its territorial presence, and strengthening of its delivery capacity.

In this context, the RC Office and UNDP requested a mission from 11 to 21 November, 2007 to carry out the following activities:

General objective:

- **In close consultation with UNDP Colombia's Country Director and senior management, the RC/HC Office, the Peace, Development and Reconciliation Programme Area, and the REDES programme team, the mission will** strengthen ongoing efforts undertaken by UNDP Colombia to develop and mainstream conflict sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian action and peace-building, recovery and reintegration, and as a result strategic entry points and areas of cooperation between UNDP-Colombia and BCPR will be identified for the development of a structured long-term Strategic Cooperation Framework. **To do so, it will review existing UNDP programming and its relationships with the UN System inter-agency platforms (such as the Early Recovery Cluster, UNS Human Rights Working Group, UNS Gender Working Group, etc.) and strengthen the PDR Programme Area's capacity to lead these efforts in the coming years.**

All of the sub-objectives described below will be developed in close consultation with the UN Resident Coordinator, UNDP Senior Management, the Coordinator of the Peace, Development, and Reconciliation Programme Area, relevant CO team members, and in coordination with RBLAC.

Specific sub-objectives:

- 1) Develop, together with the RC/HC Office and UNDP, a strategy and a work plan to mainstream conflict prevention into UNDP programming and UN System initiatives. In order to do so, the mission will:
 - a. Organize bilateral meetings with key agencies, as well as specific units within UNDP to identify possible entry points, opportunities and

¹⁰ By "Conflict sensitivity" and "conflict-sensitive approaches" UNDP implies the systematic integration of conflict analysis and resulting response strategies into the institutional mandate and programming of organizations working in conflict settings, and the integration of the conflict analysis, conflict sensitive responses and conflict focused M&E in all the program cycle.

- challenges for developing a mainstreamed approach to peace building and recovery;
- b. Provide substantive inputs on the process to carry out the work plan, which would include continued accompaniment;
 - c. Organize a 2-day workshop for UNDP staff on conflict sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance, recovery, reintegration, and peace building and reconciliation;
- 2) Work with the Peace, Development, and Reconciliation Programme Area, the REDES team, to develop guidelines and a plan for the implementation of conflict analysis exercise at the local level to be implemented at the territorial/local level. In order to do so, the mission will:
 - a. Organize a one-day workshop with the PDR Area, the REDES team, to brainstorm on lessons learnt, key principles and relevant approaches.
 - b. Consult with key stakeholders on the approach and entry points for the PDR Area.
 - c. Design a strategy for the peace and development programme area.
 - 3) Recommend a strategy and actions to strengthen UNDP's programmes at the local level. This will include: a) Rapid review of existing projects and programmes, b) Identify early recovery priorities in close consultation with the Early Recovery cluster, c) Identify gaps and programmatic opportunities, and recommend strategies to address them, d) Provide recommendations to promote economic recovery at the local level.
 - 4) Explore entry points and recommend a strategy to work and address land mines from a humanitarian and recovery perspective as UNDP and with an Inter-Agency approach.
 - 5) Recommend entry points on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, and provide technical support to develop a strategy that will strengthen the PDR Area and the REDES Programme to address main issues such as community reintegration, community based development, and other DDR specific areas.

Expected Outcomes:

- Design and facilitate a 2-day workshop for staff from UNDP's Programmatic Areas on conflict sensitive programming.¹¹
- Design and facilitation of a 1-day workshop for the Peace, Development, and Reconciliation Area to design a local level peace and development analysis.
- Prepare a 5 to 8 page local level PDA Strategy, based on existent work of the REDES programme, and considering the outcomes of the workshop.
- Development of a work plan for mainstreaming conflict prevention into UNDP, on the basis of the workshop recommendations and other consultations with key stakeholders;
- Recommendations for strengthening UNDP's local level programmes, adopting an integrated approach to conflict prevention, integrating early recovery, and multi-sectoral responses.

¹¹ The UNDP office will select ahead of the workshop one or two UNDP projects (ideally up for review) to serve as key examples for the workshop.

- Prepare a set of recommendations of strategic areas of cooperation that will be the basis for structuring a “UNDP Colombia-BCPR Cooperation Framework”.

Mission team members:

Eugenia Piza-López Senior Advisor, BCPR/UNDP 11-19/Nov	Mission team leader Broad strategic programming Local level strategic planning and implementing strategies Mainstreaming conflict prevention Early recovery and local level economic recovery
Céline Moyroud, BCPR/UNDP 11-21/Nov	Mainstreaming conflict prevention Design peace and development analysis at the local level
Marc André Franche, RBLAC/UNDP 11-21/Nov	Mainstreaming conflict prevention Design peace and development analysis at the local level
Carmen Lucia Salguero, BCPR/UNDP 11-23/Nov	Broad strategic programming Early recovery Local level strategic planning and implementing strategies

ANNEX 2
MISSION PROGRAMME

Domingo, 11 de noviembre

Llegada participantes de la misión.

5:30 pm. Reunión preparatoria y de coordinación entre participantes misión REDES en el Hotel (EPL/CM/M-AF/CS/AP)

Lunes, 12 de noviembre

8:30- 10:00 Reunión inicial con Bruno Moro, Barbara Pesce Monteiro, Maria del Carmen Sacasa, Alessandro Preti

- Presentación desde la Coordinación SNU
- Presentación Estrategia PNUD
- Presentación de CC, UNDAF, CPD

10:00 -12 Reunión Análisis de contexto: 2/3 actores claves proveen una visión actualizada de la situación de crisis en Colombia

12:00- 2:30 Almuerzo/Reunión

Reuniones con áreas de programa y equipos

- o Pobreza, desarrollo sostenible
- o Gobernabilidad
- o Escuela Virtual Desarrollo Humano

2:30-3:00 Coffee Break

3:00-7:00pm Reunión con el Área de Paz y Programa REDES.

Presentación Área de Paz / Programa REDES / Estrategia Mainstreaming.

Presentación de la estructura de la Cluster de Paz y Desarrollo

Presentación comprensiva sobre la estrategia Área de Paz, Reconciliación y Desarrollo.

Presentación Programa REDES-ART

- DDR y reintegración comunitaria
- Minas
- UNS Human Rights Working group
- UNS Gender WG
- Victimas
- Sociedad civil
- G24

Martes, 13 de noviembre

En la mañana reuniones paralelas

9:00- 11:00 Reuniones con representantes de gobierno.

- o Acción social
- o Vicepresidencia
- o DNP

9:00-11:00

Reunión con agencias contrapartes de REDES-ART

- OACNUDH, UNIFEM, UNFPA, ACNUR, OCHA, OIM, UNICEF, UNODC

11:30-2:00 Reunión/Almuerzo

Organizaciones de la sociedad civil

2:00-6:00 Reuniones Bilaterales con donantes

- COSUDE / Universidad Nacional / GTZ
- AECI / ACCD / Asdi / otros

Miércoles 14 de noviembre

8:00-10:00

Reuniones bilaterales sobre transversalkizacion en el PNUD

- Barbara, Maria del Carmen, Jefes de Area

10:00-1:00 Discusión sobre propuesta de transverzalizacion con REDES y desarrollo de estrategia preparación de taller

2:00-6:00 Taller de transversalizacion de conflicto con todos los equipos de programa

- Presentacion sobre transversalizacion
- Discusión sobre oportunidades y riesgos
- Plan de acción

Jueves, 15 de noviembre

8:00-6:00 Discusión sobre CDA a nivel local (todo el día)

- Revisión de la propuesta para el Análisis de conflicto (PDA Colombia)
- Discusión sobre la propuesta metodológica para el PDA en Colombia
- Desarrollo de estrategia para el PDA en Colombia
- Trnasversalizacion de conflicto en los programas en las regiones

Viernes 16 de Noviembre

8:00-12:00 Taller/Discusión con el área de paz y gerencia sobre enfoque territorial

- Revisión del trabajo realizado hasta ahora
 - (que hemos hecho, que hemos aprendido, que funciona, que no funciona, que debemos continuar, que debemos abandonar, que debemos desarrollar)

12:00 -1:00 Experiencias relevantes sobre enfoque territorial

- Criterios territoriales

2:30-4:00 IASC y el PNUD

4:30-6:00 Reunión con miembros del cluster de rehabilitación Temprana para discutir prioridades/temas y el proyecto conjunto

Sábado, 17 de noviembre

8:00-2:00 Reunión del equipo de Misión en el hotel

- Análisis de los temas y recomendaciones

Salida de Eugenia Piza-Lopez

Domingo, 18 de noviembre

Viaje al terreno. Neiva

Lunes, 19 de noviembre

- Regreso del terreno
- Revisión de las recomendaciones con base en la visita al terreno

Martes, 20 de noviembre

- 8:00-10:30 Videoconferencia equipo de Misión
- Revisión de recomendaciones
- Preparación del Reporte

Miércoles 21 de Noviembre

- Preparación del reporte
- Reuniones de cierre Área de Paz y Programa REDES
- Debriefing final Bruno Moro, Barbara Pesce Monteiro, María del Carmen Sacasa
- Salida equipo de Misión

ANNEX 3:

Workshop Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention (November 14, 2007) Summary of Key Outcomes

Programa del taller:

- Objetivos del taller
- Las Naciones Unidas y el PNUD en la prevención de los conflictos
- El desarrollo sensible al conflicto (1 hora y media) 3:15- 4:45 pm
- Estrategia para la transversalización del enfoque de sensibilidad al conflicto

Oportunidades para la transversalización del enfoque de sensibilidad al conflicto:

- El enfoque territorial del PNUD, sobre base de una metodología común.
- La promoción de una visión más integral del trabajo del PNUD y de las Naciones Unidas.
- La articulación de los vínculos entre prevención de los conflictos y gobernabilidad y reducción de la pobreza, particularmente al nivel territorial.
- La posibilidad de asumir el liderazgo dentro del sistema de las Naciones Unidas, y de ofrecer servicios sobre este tema a las agencias y a la comunidad internacional.
- La desigualdad como tema a ser transversalizado
- El tema electoral como plataforma para iniciar esfuerzos juntos
- Aumentar la coherencia de los diferentes programas del PNUD
- El análisis de las causas y de los actores como punto de partida para diseñar los programas del PNUD
- La necesidad de monitorear el impacto de las acciones del PNUD desde la perspectiva de la prevención de los conflictos.

Desafíos para la transversalización del enfoque de sensibilidad al conflicto:

- La cultura de la organización
- Un cambio de mentalidad y una mayor disponibilidad de trabajar juntos dentro de la oficina, sobre base de una claridad estratégica
- La necesidad de focalizar los esfuerzos en el área de la transversalización del enfoque de sensibilidad al conflicto
- Capacitación del PNUD y socios sobre este tema
- Mas herramientas practicas para facilitar la integración de este enfoque en el diseño y la implementación de los programas.

ANNEX 4

Workshop Territorial approach Summary of Key Outcomes

Workshop Programme:

- Reach agreement on territorial planning process
- Identify opportunities, challenges, and processes to develop coherent and aligned strategies for UNDP's work in the territories
- Discuss mechanisms of coordination for effective delivery in the territories
- Discuss role and composition of UNDP territorial offices

Lecciones aprendidas y oportunidades y retos del trabajo del PNUD al nivel territorial (incluso en relación al enfoque de sensibilidad al conflicto)

	Aprendizajes	Oportunidades y Retos
Pobreza y desarrollo sostenible	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) El análisis previo de las regiones es necesario, en términos de actores, riesgos, y dinámicas. 2) La necesidad de identificar complementariedades internas al PNUD y con actores externos en el territorio. 3) La necesidad de manejar las expectativas de la población y de las autoridades, especialmente cuando se tratan de intervenciones pequeñas. 4) El valor asociado a la bandera de las Naciones Unidas como herramienta de convocatoria, de construcción de confianza, y de acceso a las agendas de política pública. 5) La necesidad de priorizar acciones sobre base de un análisis de conflicto. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Como garantizar la sostenibilidad y la permanencia de los esfuerzos del PNUD en la región. 2) La necesidad de identificar criterios de intervención del PNUD al nivel territorial, incluso en territorios que sufren de otro tipo de conflictividad. 3) Como articular el trabajo al nivel territorial con otros programas del PNUD. 4) Como transversalizar el tema de sensibilidad al conflicto dentro del trabajo sobre los ODM. 5) Como utilizar el tema de desigualdad como tema común entre las áreas de pobreza y paz y desarrollo.
Gobernabilidad	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) La necesidad de construir mecanismos de articulación entre los diferentes programas, 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) La necesidad de definir más adelante como acciones de gobernabilidad pueden

	<p>porque se hace más gobernabilidad desde otras áreas.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2) La falta de sistematización de buenas y malas prácticas al nivel territorial 3) Muchas de las iniciativas permanecen puntuales y no ofrecen una plataforma sostenible. 4) Falta de capacidad para entender la diversidad regional, la dinámica del conflicto, el desarrollo institucional, etc. 	<p>apoyar la construcción de la paz.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2) Como abordar el tema del desarrollo desde la revisión de las relaciones de poder. 3) Como mejorar la planificación junta al nivel territorial dentro de un contexto de reforma del sistema de las Naciones Unidas. 4) La necesidad de construir mayor alianza y articulación dentro de la oficina del PNUD.
<p>Paz y desarrollo</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Es importante reconocer las capacidades locales e institucionales de paz, para incrementar el valor agregado de PNUD en temas de paz y desarrollo. 2) Al nivel territorial, es importante construir una agenda y un discurso único, incluso para las Naciones Unidas. 3) Cualquier intervención territorial debe construirse desde la coherencia de PNUD. 4) El compromiso con un territorio requiere acompañamiento permanente. 5) El trabajo en el territorio se debe hacer por demanda, independientemente de la agenda del PNUD. 6) En el territorio es importante generar espacio de articulación entre SNU. 7) La necesidad de fortalecer las redes sociales e institucionales como capacidades de paz. 8) El análisis de conflicto permanece de generar 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Es importante consolidar un enfoque territorial integral en los territorios sobre base del trabajo realizado. 2) La necesidad de facilitar espacios de diálogos para identificar las prioridades territoriales sin imponer la agenda del PNUD. 3) Como utilizar el equipo de paz y desarrollo como equipo transversal del PNUD para facilitar la integración de los esfuerzos al nivel territorial sobre base de la metodología REDES. 4) Como complementar el trabajo de paz en el territorio con el desarrollo local. 5) La necesidad de incidir en las políticas públicas, al nivel local y nacional.

	<p>un conocimiento común sobre retos y oportunidades del conflicto.</p> <p>9) El PNUD tiene un rol fundamental como constructor de puentes entre actores territoriales</p>	
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Grupos de trabajo sobre el enfoque de PNUD al nivel territorial, en tres territorios distintos donde la organización tiene programas (Nariño; Meta; y Soacha)

	Oportunidades, y retos para desarrollar estrategias integrales al nivel territorial	Mecanismos de coordinación	Rol y composición de las oficinas territoriales
Nariño	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Armonización y coherencia, a través de mecanismos como planes de desarrollo, planes de vida u otros planes estratégicos existentes 2) Tema fronterizo, con coordinación con el PNUD Ecuador. 3) A través del tema de recuperación dentro de las mesas humanitarias. 4) A través de la coordinación del sistema de Naciones Unidas. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Compartir información con los demás colegas de la oficina 2) Compartir metodologías que el PNUD utiliza en otros territorios 3) Análisis de conflictividad 4) Grupos de trabajo territorial, involucrando a colegas del PNUD de todas las áreas para que todas las visiones estén presentes. 5) Poner a disposición una mejor intranet. 6) Articularnos a mecanismos existentes en el territorio. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) A través de la oficina territorial 2) Responsabilidad compartida en los niveles territoriales y nacional, que no se descargue todo en el nivel territorial 3) Precisando los roles de la oficina y sus integrantes 4) Reuniones periódicas sobre la problemática regional y las iniciativas en curso. Teniendo un dialogo específico sobre cada región, en el que participe la gerencia para generar decisiones políticas y acompañamiento técnico. 5) La posibilidad de tener puntos focales en Bogotá para los territorios en los que no existe oficinas en los territorios pero sobre los cuales se va a trabajar.

<p>Meta</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Neutralidad y credibilidad del PNUD en el territorio 2) Como no dejarse comprometer por los grupos antagónicos. 3) Como complementarse con otras intervenciones de la Unión Europea y otros actores de cooperación internacional. 4) Existen situaciones políticas legales pero no necesariamente legítimas 5) Las diferentes áreas del PNUD trabajan la intervención territorial con instrumentos y metodologías que logren incorporar el enfoque de conflicto 6) Mayor coordinación interagencial 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Es mas fácil lograr la coordinación en territorios específicos, al igual que coordinación integral 2) Organizar un grupo en el PNUD con las diferentes áreas para hacer análisis de conflicto no solo con la mirada de paz, sino con una mirada corporativa que incluya varias perspectivas 3) Asegurar que la coordinación territorial participe en el diseño de acciones coordinadas. 4) Tener criterios de intervención territorial antes de pensar en el territorio 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Lograr mecanismos claros de coordinación entre la región y Bogotá. 2) Apoyo de las diferentes aéreas en el territorio, a partir de un proyecto común. 3) La estructura de Bogotá no facilita el trabajo territorial. Debe buscarse una forma de diseño institucional que lo logre. 4) Es necesario precisar roles y niveles de acción y de poder de cada actor que participa en la intervención territorial 5) Es necesario que los grupos territoriales tengan respaldo institucional
<p>Soacha</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Una oportunidad es que por ser tan cercana a Bogotá. 2) acompañamiento cercano del área de paz en los siguientes temas <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Como se han identificado 30 proyectos estratégicos , hacer un análisis desde el área de paz para ver si estos proyectos 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Existen actualmente dos mecanismos, una mesa humanitaria coordinado por OCHA, y una mesa interagencial que funcionan bastante bien. 2) Establecer un equipo de coordinación que logre articular los saberes de 	

	<p>tienen enfoque sensible al conflicto</p> <p>b. OCHA y UNDSS hacen análisis permanente de la situación del territorio, pero el área de paz puede dar un plus a esos análisis desde la perspectiva del conflicto.</p> <p>c. Podría incorporarse el tema de víctimas y de justicia transicional, y mecanismos de solución alternativa de conflictos.</p> <p>3) Identificar el tipo de enfoque de trabajo territorial en la zona, para ver el enfoque poblacional que hasta ahora no se ha considerado funciona</p> <p>4) Identificar como el área de gobernabilidad puede entrar y con qué herramientas y mecanismos.</p>	<p>todos los colegas respecto a tareas puntuales.</p> <p>3) Existe una oficina en la casa de naciones unidas que hace la coordinación en terreno.</p>	
Montes de Maria	1) Se ha realizado análisis de conflicto, mapeo de	1) Conformar un equipo que diseñe la	1) Definir la estrategia territorial. 2) Liderar la coordinación

	<p>actores y caracterización del territorio</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2) Existen varios estudios que se han realizado relacionados con el territorio. 3) Se ha generado una capacidad incipiente de monitoreo y coordinación 4) Existen mecanismos de coordinación como las reuniones interagenciales y las mesas de operadores humanitarios 5) Hay unos acuerdos y convenios de cooperación sobre mínimos comunes que tienen las agencias articulados por el PDP en su mayoría. 6) Realizar un análisis integral del territorio a través de los saberes de todas las áreas del PNUD 7) Realizar un análisis permanente de la situación del territorio 8) Encontrar socios locales legítimos. 9) Continuar con la coordinación interagencial 10) Armonizar intereses internos sectoriales y de los donantes en el territorio. 11) Diseñar indicadores de impacto y sistematizar lecciones 	<p>estrategia de intervención territorial del PNUD y que brinde asistencia técnica a los equipos, que garantice espacios de socialización y reflexión</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2) Promover reuniones de los grupos territoriales del trabajo en los territorios. 3) Mantener los mecanismos existentes 4) Garantizar información actualizada de la forma en que avanzan las iniciativas 5) Evaluar la forma y el procedimiento de los PACs para que sean realmente pertinentes y sustantivos. 	<p>interagencial.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3) Realizar un intercambio regular, bimestral, o lo mas frecuente posible a través de diálogos, seminarios, talleres, etc. 4) Definir el rol y el alcance de las iniciativas y funcionarios del PNUD que permita una verdadera coordinación. Es fundamental en especial con los consultores eventuales o por proyectos. 5)
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	aprendidas. 12) Fortalecer mecanismos de monitoreo y evaluación.		
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Elementos específicos para integrar la dimensión del conflicto al nivel territorial dentro de los programas del PNUD.

- Capacitación de todo el personal para poder tener la capacidad de evaluar los riesgos y oportunidades e incorporar un enfoque sensible al conflicto;
- Herramientas para hacer un análisis de conflicto participativo con actores locales;
- Tener en cuenta el impacto sobre los grupos específicos en relación al conflicto;
- Elaborar un "check-list" que contemple un enfoque sensible al conflicto, y que se utilice de manera real en el diseño y la ejecución de proyectos e iniciativas institucionales.
- Las intervenciones territoriales son procesos y no proyectos puntuales, y por tanto exigen un abordaje integral y de largo plazo.
- Empezar con un proceso de sensibilización y capacitación interna.
- Realizar un análisis del conflicto desde la perspectiva territorial y que sirva para el PNUD, socios y contrapartes.
- Vincular la estrategia regional con las causas estructurales del conflicto
- Realizar una intervención integral priorizando grupos poblacionales.